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"judicial legislation" has been leveled at less obvious and calculated decisions
of the Court. Ten years of experience under the Fair Labor Standards Act have
demonstrated that some of its provisions require revision. The minimum wage
of forty cents an hour, for example, is clearly not in accord with our present
financial structure. 6' But if the present decision is out of line with the best interests of the nation today, the fault is with the statute, not the Court; and the
agency to effect a change is the Congress.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES-A STUDY
IN MISPLACED SOLICITUDE
There cannot be a stronger proof of that genuine freedom, which is the boast of
this age and country, than the power of discussing and examining, with decency and
respect, the limits of the king's prerogative. A topic, that in some former ages was
thought too delicate and sacred to be profaned by the pen of a subject. It was ranked
among the secrets of the empire and, like the mysteries of the good goddess, was not
suffered to be pried into by any but such as were initiated in its service: because perhaps
the exertion of the one, like the solemnities of the other, would not bear the inspection
of a rational and sober inquiry.
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Although the nation's judiciary has transplanted the king's prerogative in
the United States under the name of government immunities, a recent case
before the Supreme Court fails to give evidence that the enlightened approach
to the subject which prevailed in the era of the Great Commentator has taken
root here.
On a 1945 contract between Merrill, an Idaho farmer, and the Federal Crop.
Insurance Corporation, the latter refused to pay for the loss of Merrill's wheat
crop because the acreage involved was not insurable according to the government corporation's regulations., The local agent, to whom Merrill had given
full details concerning the nature of the crop, had assured him that his crop was
insurable. On the strength of this information Merrill planted his crop and refrained from taking out other insurance. 2 The application blank required no description which would have shown that the crop involved was spring wheat
reseeded on winter wheat acreage, a fact which would have revealed to an agent
with knowledge of the regulations that the crop was not insurable. Accordingly,
the application for insurance was approved in routine fashion upon being submitted by the local agent in Idaho to the regional office in Denver. The regional
office forwarded to plaintiff an acceptance stating: "The insurance contract
consists of the accepted application and the Wheat Crop Insurance Regula6zEmbodied in the message of the President to Congress accompanying his approval of the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 was a recommendation that the minimum wage be raised to at
least 65 cents an hour. H.R. Doc. 247, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (1947).
' Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations, Sec. 414.J, io Fed. Register i586 (1945).
' Merrill's brief in the Idaho Supreme Court at 22, 26 (1946).
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tions, copies of which are enclosed. We suggest that you carefully redd the provisions of your contract."3 However, evidence was admitted to show that no
copy of the regulations was enclosed.
The FCI&C conceded that plaintiff did not receive actual notice of the regulations but insisted that the Federal Register Act, which makes publication of
regulations in that journal notice "to all persons affected by them," had discharged its duty to give notice when the rules in issue were so published.4 The
FCIC further contended that once it had fulfilled that obligation it was not
bound by rules of estoppel which would have been operative had the insurer
been a private insurance corporation. The Idaho Supreme Court could not
agree with this point of view and held the government corporation estopped
because it was conducting a "proprietary insurance business."5 But the United
States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, reversed that
6
decision, five to four, in FederalCrop Insurance Corporationv. Merrill.
The language of the brief decision agrees emphatically with the FCIC argument: The government does not become bound by rules of liability applicable
to a private activity, either because it is engaged in a proprietary rather than a
governmental function or because it assumes the corporate form rather than the
form of conventional executive agencies and bureaus. Although the decision
becomes somewhat obscure on the next point, it seems that the majority proceeds on the theory that the Court may not impose liability upon the United
States in this situation without a congressional declaration that the unit it has
created is not to enjoy some or all of the immunities traditionally accorded
agencies of government. 7 Having foreclosed all inquiry along the latter lines,
Justice Frankfurter made an affirmative statement of the doctrine of governmental immunity as it applies to the instant case: He who deals with the government (and the government acts only through its agents) "takes the risk of
having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government
stays within the bound of his authority."8
To concede that an activity is a governmental one conducted by an agent of
the government is to place it in a company entitled to a goodly number of immunities. These are commonly held to comprise freedom from suability, freedom from the application of the rules of laches and estoppel, freedom from the
effects of statutes of limitations, and also certain procedural advantages arising
out of claims sounding in tort and contract. It is understandable why the SuFCIC brief in the Supreme Court of the United States at 6 (1947).
Register Act, 49 Stat. 502 (z935), 44 U.S.C.A. § 307 (Supp., 1947).
s Merrill v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 174 P. Ad 834, 836 (Idaho, 1946).
4 Federal

U.S. 380 (1947).
7This notion is most strongly expressed in a footnote in the decision: "The rules of law
whereby private insurance companies are rendered liable for the acts of their agents are not
bodily applicable to a government agency like the Corporation, unless Congress has so provided." Ibid., at 383 n. z.
8Ibid., at 384.
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preme Court in the Merrill case disagrees with one who points to the twin
aspects of corporate form and commercial purpose which a governmental activity may possess in order to demonstrate that it should not enjoy an immunity. A governmental unit designated a "corporation" by Congress is a
unique kind of agency possessed of a misleading name. A typical example of the
wide deviation from private corporate structure in these agencies may be found
in the Federal Crop Insurance Act. 9
The FCIC enjoys the franking privilege" ° and immunity from taxation." It
may use the facilities of any governmental activity in carrying out its work."2
Its capital stock of $ioo,ooo,ooo is free of the burden of administrative expenses
which are covered by a maximum annual $12,ooo,ooo appropriation.'3 At the
time of the contract in question in this case, part of the program was characterized as "experimental,"' 4 and at present an economy-minded Congress has
put the entire program on an experimental basis. s In eight years the cost to the
government has been $iooooo,ooo inexcess of premiums received. 6 Further
differences may be pointed out, but the above should suffice to demonstrate the
futility of basing liability on an argument which proceeds from form.
Selection of the corporate form, especially in the nineteen thirties, provided
psychological advantages and made possible constant revision of the methods
and scope of activity of agencies through procedures unusual for government at
that time. It particularly avoided the delays which would have been engendered
if approval by the Comptroller General had been required for expenditures
covering the ever-changing categories of home loans, insurable crops, and businesses eligible for government credit."' It has been suggested that the corporate
form was popular because some units could, by using that form, remain free
from the whims of Congress, since the money necessary to existence did not
come from annual appropriations but from a sum derived from "sale" of capital
stock to the government. 8 Subsequent to the era of rapid proliferation of government corporations, however, Congress destroyed most of these advantages
through the enactment of the Financial Control of Government Corporations
9 52 Stat. 72 (1938),
"S 52 Stat. 73 (1938),

7 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (i939).
7 U.S.C.A. § i5o6 f (1939).

"52 Stat. 75 (1938), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1511 (1939).

Stat. 73 (1938), 7 U.S.C.A. § i5o6 g (1939).
'3 55 Stat. 255, 256 (194I), 7 U.S.C.A. § 15r6 (Supp., 1947).
12 52

'4

58 Stat. 928 (x944).

1s6I Stat. 550 (1947), 7 U.S.C.A. § i5o6 a (Supp., 1947).
x6H.R. Rep. 450, 8oth Cong. ist Sess., at 32-33 (1947).
7 United States ex rel. Skinner and Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U.S. i, 8 (1928); McDiarmid, Government Corporations and Private Funds, 3 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1094 (1937); The
Corporation as a Federal Administrative Device, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 346, 356 (2935).

18McDiarmid, op. cit. supra note 17. The FCIC relies upon. annual appropriations for administrative expenses. Note 13 supra.
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Act.' 9 At present the Comptroller General has auditing control together with
power to deliver opinions on the legality of expenditures. All wholly owned government corporations must submit a detailed annual budget to Congress."° In
addition, a recent amendment to the Act gives Congress power to control ex-

penditure of corporate funds

directly."

If a litigant turns to the accompanying contention that a government corporation is engaged in a typical private activity and should therefore be bound
by the rules of the market place, the reply will be that this does not alter the
fact that it remains "an agency selected by the Government to accomplish
purely Governmental purposes."- Whenever created, government corporations
were justified as needed in wartime or in an economic crisis, 23 or as providing a
facility that private enterprise would not undertake to furnish, typical of which
is crop insurance against all types of losses.24
At this point the basic issue of the case is uncovered. For one must begin a
search for the reasons supporting the argument that, regardless of the type of
activity involved, governmental agencies are entitled to all traditional immunities. The ancient wheeze about the royal prerogative and the assumption that
he who makes the laws does not violate them is no longer deemed
a reason for the immunities, but is at most a reference to their historical
origins The reasons advanced for invoking an immunity may be reduced to an
assertion that the government deals with formidable problems under severe
administrative handicaps, making necessary this special protection without
which great losses to the public and severe restrictions upon essential activity of
the state would follow. The arguments run that the government has a multitude
of things in its care which it is hard pressed to manage because of the lack of
personnel and funds, the fragmentation of its agencies, the fact that the cost of
guarding such things as public land would be prohibitive, and (a judicial
prejudice that is implicit in some decisions) the incompetence and negligence of
6
some governmental officials.
There are significant exceptions to the application of immunity rules. Laches
will be a bar when the government presses a suit for recovery of land long settled
19 59 Stat. 597 (1945), 31 U.S.C.A. § 841 (Supp., 1947).
2o 59 Stat. 598, 599 (1945), 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 847, 851 (Supp., 1947).
21 61

Stat. 584 (1947), 31 U.S.C.A. § 849 (Supp., 1947).

"Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 536, 539 (1945).
2 Keifer and Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 3o6 U.S. 381, 390 (1939);
McDiarmid, op. cit. supra note 17, at zo96, 1o97.
24FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 n. x (1947).
"2s

tions,

B. Comm. *237-82; H. F. Pinney, The Legal Status of Federal Government Corpora27

Calif. L. Rev. 712, 714 n. 14 (1939).

26 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 3o4 U.S. 126, 133 (1938); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489, 490 (1878); United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat (U.S.) 720, 735
(1824); Lee v. Munroe and Thornton, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 366, 368 (I813); Maine, Ancient Law 3
et seq. (ioth ed. 1930).
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and improved.27 When a party to commercial paper, the United States is on a
par with all other holders,s except that the application of this rule is to be left
to the federal judiciary.29 The exception is significant because of the courts'
power to substitute for the state interpretations of the law of negotiable instruments either its own current theories or the commercial law developed under
Swift v. Tyson.- ° Further, when the government brings a bill in equity, the court
will hold it estopped if it would be grossly unfair to permit the party who misled
the defendant to initiate an action founded on the defendant's honest but mistaken reliance.3' Successively, the establishment of a Court of Claims,32 the
Tucker Act, 33 and the Federal T6rt Claims Act 3 4 have made possible direct

judicial action in tort and contract against the government. In England and the
Dominions the power to sue the government is accorded individuals through
the Petition of Rights. 35 Actions for the redress of negligent and unauthorized
acts of government officials, as well as the assertion of rules of laches and
36
estoppel against the government, have long been allowed on the Continent.
Both the judicial exceptions to governmental immunities and the statutes
permitting suit where immunities formerly precluded action are based on notions of procedural convenience and fairness. Opposition to the root concepts
which supposedly justify the application of immunity rules has stemmed from
the same grounds of fairness. At least one international conference has recommended that free trade be served by according no immunities to government
agencies employed in commercial enterprises.'7 The United States government,
which has been described as "the world's biggest business,"3 is now relied upon
to provide important services hired for value by parties ranging from the wellcounseled corporation to the legally inept home builder or farmer. A quarter
of a century ago, when this trend had scarcely begun, the unfairness of indiscriminate application of the immunities was condemned:
27Iowa

v. Carr, 19i Fed. 257 (C.C.A. 8th, 19i); United States v. Stinson, 125 Fed. 907

(C.C.A. 7th, i9o3), aff'd i97 U.S. 200 (io5).
28

"The United States does business on business terms." United States v. National Ex-

change Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 396, 398 (1875);

The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 666 (i868).
29Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
30 i6 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842).
3XWalker v. United States, 139 Fed. 409, 413 (D.C. Ala., i9o5); United States v. Stinson,
125 Fed. 907, 910 (C.C.A. 7th, i9o3), aff'd '97 U.S. 200 (19o5). The problem has been considered in the light of the instant case. 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1948).
3' io Stat. 612 (1855).
3324 Stat. 505 (1887).
346o Stat. 843 (1946), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 92r et seq. (Supp., 1947).
35

Crown Companies and Civil Liability, 22 Can. Bar J. 927, 930 (1944).:

36Borchard,

Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale 1, 2 (1924).
37Ownership of Stock by Foreign Government as Affecting Amenability to Suit, 42 Harv.
L. Rev. 1078 (1929), citing i World Economic Conference 35 (League of Nations, 1927).
38$8 Billion Dollar Day, 52 Time, No. 2, at i5 (July 12, 1948).
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The hazards run by the administrative officer who may have acted in perfect good
faith, and by the private individual... manifest defective social engineering...
hardly creditable to an enlightened community.... It requires but a slight appreciation of the facts to realize that in Anglo-American law the individual is left to bear all
the risks of a defective, negligent, perverse or erroneous administration of the State's
functions, an unjust burden which is becoming graver and more frequent as the
Government's activities become more diversified and as we leave to administrative
officers in even greater degree the determination of the legal relations of the individual citizen.... [But] there seems no sound reason why the English-speaking countries, where the public service is usually in less professional hands than on the continent, should not adopt modem social and legal principles in determining the legal
relations between the government in its administration of the public services, the
officers and agents whom it employs for this service, and the individual members of
the community.a9
It is difficult to imagine a more effective way to arrest the evolution of "social
and legal principles" leading to a discriminating use of government immunities
than by way of the majority position in the Merrill case. Although the Supreme
Court took the salutary step of rejecting the form and commercial purpose argument, some equivocal statements leave the impression that it dismissed the
possibility of valid alternative arguments by declaring itself powerless to determine the scope of the estoppel immunity without explicit directions from Congress. The justification for this conclusion seems to be that judicial initiative in
the matter would be judicial "legislation." Yet a consideration of the line of
precedent relied upon to uphold the "estoppel" immunity in the Merrilldecision
casts considerable doubt upon the assumption that this immunity is so irrevocably fixed upon the law as to make mandatory its a priori application by the
judiciary. Instead, these decisions reveal that the doctrine is judge-made, that
it has arisen in cases where the elements of a true estoppel are actually missing,
and that all too often the immunity enters a case as a makeweight or weak
alternative ground of decision.
If a branch of estoppel is involved here, it is not that founded on a judicial
record or deed. Rather it is the notion of equitable estoppel or estoppel in
pais.40 The concept has been variously defined. When operative it denies, in the
interests of equity and justice, the right of a party to plead an "admittedly true
fact." Equitable estoppel operates only where there has been a positive representation or act done with serious purpose, the consequence of which is justifiable reliance and action by the other party to his detriment, founded on ignorance of the true state of affairs behind the representation (which may have
been made in good faith, or in ignorance when there was a duty to be informed).4'
39Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 2, 3 (1924).
40 Everest,

The Law of Estoppel i-iS (19o7).

41.3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence i9x (i941); Bigelow, The Law of Estoppel 570 (189o);

i Herman, Law of Estoppel 6 (1886).
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The facts of this case need not be strained to find an estoppel situation.
Merrill relied upon the assurances of the local and regional agents of the
FCIC and received no actual notice of the rules declaring his crop uninsurable.
Accordingly, he refrained from getting other insurance2 Further, he appears to
have based his decision to take the risk of reseeding the winter-killed acreage
on the assumption that the crop was insurable.43 Reliance, change of position,
and consequent detriment are all present.
Despite these facts and despite the framing of all previous decisions and
briefs in terms of estoppel theory, the word "estoppel" appears at no point in the
Merrill decision. If these previous arguments are faulty, the majority takes no
pains to demonstrate the error. The underlying premise may be that this is not
an estoppel situation at all: that plaintiff suffered no detriment. If that is true,
the case is governed by another immunity which flatly asserts that no citizen
may rely upon the apparent authority of government officials whatever the cir44
cumstances.
The cases supporting the latter immunity lie in the same twilight zone as the
cases which employ the rationale of estoppel. The two lines of decision are intermingled in that one is cited to support the other; at times they unite to form
alternate grounds for a decision. In fact they may well Coincide, since the cases
disclose that the Supreme Court has seldom dealt with a true estoppel situation.
Thus, it may be better to say that the essence of the Merrill decision is that
estoppel cannot become operative against the government because reliance on
apparent authority, if that authority does not exist in fact, can never be justifiable reliance.
Whatever his purpose in skirting the magic word, Justice Frankfurter is
stating the logical consequences of the theory that a private citizen has no right
to evoke the doctrine of estoppel or rules governing apparent authority of agents
against a unit of the government. That being so, the citizen is charged with the
duty of knowing the applicable regulations; he "takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays
4'"[Hlad the plaintiffs had the slightest idea that the defendant insurance company was
not insuring their crop, they most certainly would have procured insurance from other companies... ." Merrill's brief in the Idaho Supreme Court at 31 (1946).
43Application was made on March 26, '945. Seeding took place "in March and April."
At the time Merrill applied, a witness present in the county agent's office described a portion
of the interview as follows, "It was discussed among the group there what kind of spring
wheat it would be better to sow on this winter-killed grain." Merrill's Brief at 22, 4, 26.
Whether or not the Supreme Court knew these facts or whether they were emphasized in oral
arguments is conjectural. In the same vein it may be noted that the court did not take judicial
notice of the fact that Merrill was a lawyer, nor did it note that as a farmer he should have
known that on newly-broken sage brush land in an Idaho dry farm area, the winter wheat
crop would remove so much moisture from the soil that failure of the spring wheat crop would
be a foregone conclusion. It should be kept in mind that the majority states, "And so we assume
that recovery could be had against a private insurance company." FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380, 383 (1947).
44Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921); Bradley v. United States, 98 U.S. 1o4
(1878); Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S. 247 (1876).
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within the bounds of his authority."4S No amount of semantic acrobatics can
alter the fact that if an equitable rule of fairness identical with or akin to
estoppel could be invoked against the government, the citizen's duty to be a
research expert in governmental organization and procedure would cease; he
could treat the government as a private organization and justifiably rely upon
the front (acts done within the scope of the apparent authority of agents) which
it presents to the public.
Decisions invoking the estoppel and apparent authority immunities are commonly justified by citation of a well-worn line of decisions. The first and only
case before the Supreme Court to involve a clear estoppel situation was Lee v.
Munroe and Thornton46 wherein officials of the District of Columbia misled Lee
as to the status of land claims against the District held by his debtor. Lee parted
with his notes in exchange for a worthless claim. The rationale offered in this
case-that an official's incaution and mistake would lead to large losses of public
land-is the only one ever offered by the Supreme Court in estoppel immunity
cases.
The Floyd Acceptances,47 cited by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Merrillcase,
did not rely on an immunity. It applied the then current theory that any holder
in due course must satisfy himself that the issuing agent acted within the scope
of his authority.48 Filorv. United States49 was, on the other hand, primarily devoted to the question of jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over wartime
seizures. It was utterly devoid of justifiable reliance by the plaintiffs, Confederate owners suing on a "lease" executed by Union officers ordered to seize the
property. In fact, the plaintiffs' knowledge of the actual status of the property
precluded the possibility of even a modicum of reliance.
Hawkins v. UnitedStatessoand Pine River Logging Company v. United Statess,
are alike in that plaintiffs sought to justify their deviation from explicit terms in
written contracts. In the Hawkins case, a quarry operator bid for and was
awarded the stone contract for a post office which stipulated that variations
from the contract had to be authorized in writing by the Secretary of the Treasury. Although plaintiff failed to protest the acts of an independent contractor
who rejected his first load of stone and demanded stone of a higher quality, he
felt free to sue the government for the value of the costlier stone supplied. In
the Pine River case plaintiffs solemnly asserted that they had relied upon apparently collusive directions given by a government "supervisor" who allowed
the defendants to cut 17,ooo,ooo board feet of lumber on a 2,ooo,ooo board feet

contract.
In Utah Power and Light Company v. United StatesS 2 also cited in the Merrill
decision, the Court was asked to believe that a several million dollar power in4sFCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947).
467

Cranch (U.S.) 366 (1813).

47 7

Wall. (U.S.) 666 (x868).
at 676.

48Ibid.,

(x869).
so96 U.S. 689 (x877).
5'186 U.S. 279 (i9oi).
S2243 U.S. 389 (1917).
49 9 Wall. (U.S.) 45
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vestment was made in facilities erected on public land in reliance upon an
undocumented agreement with "unmentioned officers or agents of the United
States."ss A recitation of the apparent authority and estoppel immunity rules
is to be found in Wilber National Bank v. United States,s4 in which the Court also
went out of its way to point out that the elements of estoppel and justifiable
reliance upon apparent authority were absent, since plaintiff was not misled by
any assertions of the government. It is in some respects like the Merrill case
(and is therein cited), except that the insured was plainly told on the policy he
received that he had to submit a certificate of insurability together with full
payment of all arrearages.
United States v. Stewarts involved certain investors in depressed farm loan
bonds who argued that all gains on the bonds were tax exempt because, among
other things, the government agency interested in the sale of the bonds had
issued circulars saying that the bonds and their income were free from taxation.
The Supreme Court noted the trial court's finding that the plaintiffs had reasonably relied upon the statements in the brochures, but apparently had a hard
time in swallowing that finding. It prefaced its discussion of the agent's authority with this clause: "Aside from the fact that these statements are hardly more
specific than the statute itself. ..." It is also apparent that the investors well
knew that these vague statements were not made by treasury agents.
The litigation in United States v. City and County of San Franciscos6 grew out
of the fact that the municipality had breached a condition of a contract made in
1913, granting it the use of public lands for power and water development, by
reselling the power produced to private distributors. Not until the violent political and economic changes of the thirties did the Department of the Interior take
notice of the breach. In this situation, ringing with political overtones, the city
and power companies professed profound ignorance of the political facts of life
and argued that rules of estoppel should apply. The court tactfully pointed out
that their conduct had not been sanctioned but merely tolerated. Estoppel is a
makeweight; the majority was content to say that "it is enough to repeat"
57
the formula in the Utah Power case.
All but one (and that nearly a century and a half old) of these cases are thus
lacking in one or the other of the elements necessary to an equitable estoppel,
usually because of the impossibility of finding apparent authority and its consequence, justifiable reliance. Were it possible to frame each of these situations in
reference to private parties, it would be said in each case that equity's office
would be abused by a finding that those who invoked estoppel were justified in
relying as they did upon the agents' words and deeds. Yet this tottering line of
53 Ibid., at 408. In this and the Pine River Logging case the immunities connected with
laches and neglect of duty on the part of government agents came into play as well. Moreover,
in this case the court took pains to point out that a suit involving public land "stands upon a
different plane." Ibid., at 409.
s4 294

U.S.

120

ss311 U.S. 6o

(1935).

(1940).

s6310

U.S. i6 (i94o).

S7Ibid., at

32.
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cases is the sum of the precedent that sustains the Merrill ruling. In terms of
precedent, then, the Merrill case is a bold step in the way of strengthening the
theory of immunities; it well illustrates the shortcomings of an argument by
analogy without an effort to explain and then distinguish, if possible.
"Attenuated" would be a charitable adjective to apply to the relation between the fact situations in the cases discussed and that in the instant case.
Here an administrative agency has been protected from the consequences of a
misleading course of conduct while engaged in the act of providing a hired (and
partially subsidized) service to a citizen acting in good faith. Further, the misapprehension was created through neglect on the part of agents in the field, the
use of application forms which failed to supply the regional officials with useful
information, and an accepted contract, delivery of which in toto was contingent
upon a secretary stuffing an essential enclosure in an envelope. It is scarcely unreasonable to assume that a govemmen't agency with eight years of administrative experience and a substantial annual appropriation could safeguard itself
against such bungling in routine tasks without pleading for an immunity. Nor
does it seem fair that every man should shoulder the burden of this decision
and approach his government with a sense of deep and abiding suspicion, and
thus engage in a broad burlesque of caveat emptor in its heyday.
Despite the easily distinguished precedents relating to estoppel, the Supreme
Court seemed to protest that it is powerless to act without congressional direction. However, it may be said that the judiciary, rather than Congress, has
cherished the immunities. Justice Frankfurter has gone so far as to concede that
Congress made its emergency agencies subject to suit because "the present
climate of opinion... has brought governmental immunity from suit into
disfavor ....

,58

Most important of all, it is hard to see how Congress can

possibly enact any but the vaguest sort of standard as to what would constitute
a proper application of an immunity in the myriad situations in which they
could be in issue. As an aid to the judicial process a statute would be useless;
what is needed is a legal arsenal replete with distinctions, analogies, and precedents to replace the solemn repetition of a dogma which exists on a higher plane
than the case law which created it.
The better position would be an outright abolition of the immunities. The
government has settled millions in damage claims after every war it has fought.
It permits suits against itself in tort and contract. This does not appear to have
brought the nation to the brink of financial ruin. The presumption would seem
to be that the Republic would continue solvent even if its citizens had of right a
chance to be remunerated for losses produced through mistake, delay, or illegal
actions on the part of government agencies. Those who decry government inefficiency might well give their traditional whipping boys a rest and consider the
worth of this sanction. Federal agencies would be on their mettle if they had to
explain to Congress that charges on the Treasury were required to satisfy
s8Keifer and Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 3o6 U.S. 381, 391 (1938).
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claims arising from administrative failings. At least it may be argued that
courts could well indulge in an assumption opposite to that which they now
make in applying judicially created immunities: In the absence of a congressional declaration that specified immunities are to be accorded an agency, the
acts of such units will be subject to the rules of law commonly applied in litigation involving private parties.

JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF MORAL CONDUCT
IN CITIZENSHIP HEARINGS
The dilution of personal liberties in other parts of the world has made United
States citizenship an increasingly desirable element of personal status. As a
result, our naturalization requirements have become of vital importance to
many aliens who have been admitted to this country and who are seeking
citizenship. Quite possibly the most perplexing standard which must be met is
that of "good moral character."'
Aware of the problems of a stranger from another community seeking recognition in a new environment, our courts and immigration authorities must
apply this standard to arrive at a definition of "good morals" which will be'just
to the applicant and healthy for our society. A striking example of the complications which ensue from the attempted application of the standard is Repouille v.
2
United States.

In the Repouille case an appeal was taken from an order of a district court
granting Repouille's petition for naturalization. The order was reversed and the
petition was dismissed without prejudice. The reversal turned on the court's
determination that the petitioner had not conducted himself as a person of
good moral character during the five years before he filed his petition. The facts
shown were that on October 12, 1939 the petitioner had deliberately put to
death his son, a boy of thirteen, by means of chloroform. The child had "suffered from birth from a brain injury which destined him to be an idiot and a
physical monstrosity malformed in all four limbs. The child was blind, mute,
and deformed. He had to be fed; the movements of his bladder and bowels were
involuntary, and his entire life was spent in a small crib."3 Toward his other
x34 Stat. 598 (i9o6), 8 U.S.C.A. § 707 (a)(3) (1942). Most decisions on good moral character are made at the administrative level by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
under 8 C.F.R. (Supp., 1947) §§ 353.1-353.3. There has been considerable disagreement concerning the periods of time which a court may survey and consider in making its decision concerning character. Some have held, as the statute provides, that the court is restricted to the
five years immediately preceding the date of the petition. Petition of Zele, I4O F. 2d 773
(C.C.A. 2d, 1944). Others have inquired into the whole life history of the applicant in order to
ascertain his true character and inclinations. In re Taran, 52 F. Supp. 535 (Minn., 1943). It
seems clear that the requirement of good moral character survives the filing date of the petition
and persists until and including the date of final hearing. United States v. Palmeri, 52 F. Supp.
226 (N.Y., 1943).
2i65
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(C.C.A. 2d, 1947).

3 Ibid., at

152.

